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Abstract:  Arguments  are  all  pervasive  in  negotiations;  and  yet,  conventional  negotiation 
theories often treat them as merely epiphenomenal to power and interests. The past decade, 
however, witnessed a growing interest in theories of deliberation and their application at the 
international level. This article takes stock of the state of the art. It argues that the “delibera-
tive turn” has forced both rationalist and constructivist scholars to refine their arguments and 
reconsider their methodology. We argue that the new research frontier for constructivists is in 
assessing under which circumstances arguments affect negotiating actors‟ preferences, and 
subsequently lead to outcomes that are not easily explained in pure bargaining terms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Arguing, understood as reason-giving, is all pervasive in international politics: Nego-
tiating actors give reasons for their position and demands at almost any time, regardless of 
whether talks are conducted in public or behind closed doors. Negotiation theories often treat 
arguments as epiphenomenal to power and interests (see, however, John Odell‟s contribution 
to this volume). The past decade, however, witnessed a growing interest in theories of delibe-
ration and their application at the international level. This article takes stock of the state of the 
art. We argue that the “deliberative turn” has forced both rationalist and constructivist scho-
lars to refine their arguments and reconsider their methodology. We argue that the new re-
search frontier for constructivists is in assessing under which circumstances arguments affect 
negotiating actors‟ preferences, and subsequently lead to outcomes that are not easily ex-
plained in pure bargaining terms. The article begins with an overview of the debate as it origi-
nated in the field of International Relations and has reached EU studies in recent years. We 
then conceptualize “arguing” as opposed to “bargaining” and develop a set of hypotheses on 
the conditions under which arguing and reasoning matters in multilateral negotiations includ-
ing the EU. We conclude with a very brief empirical illustration on how one can operational-
ize these assumptions which is taken from a larger study on negotiations in the European 
Convention as compared to Intergovernmental Conferences.
1 
 
THE  DEBATE:  WHERE  IT  STARTED,  HOW  IT  REACHED  EU  STUDIES,  AND 
WHERE IT IS NOW 
Emanating from a controversy in the German quarterly Zeitschrift für Internationale Bezie-
hungen (e.g. Keck 1995; Müller 1994; Risse-Kappen 1995; Schneider 1994; Zangl and Zürn 
1996), the last decade witnessed an intensive debate on the role of arguing versus bargaining 
in multilateral negotiations. In the meantime, we have seen a veritable “deliberative turn” in   3 
the study of such negotiations and of international politics in general.
2 Several deficiencies of 
bargaining theory informed by rational choice triggered the debate: First, arguing in the sense 
of reason-giving is all pervasive in public as well as private setting , and yet they are often 
treated as merely epiphenomenal to interests and power. But if they are superfluous for nego-
tiation processes and outcomes, the mere fact that they are nonetheless used with vehemence 
is  in need of explanation. Second, bargaining theories are inhe rently contradictory: Since 
problems of collective actions almost always have multiple solutions that entail different di s-
tributive consequences for the parties involved, negotiating parties have incentives to misrep-
resent information about their preferences. Agreements are therefore very difficult to achieve 
among instrumental actors (see Fearon 1998; Morrow 1994; Müller 2004). Third, multilateral 
negotiations often yield surprising results, which are not expected on the basis of the interests 
represented at the bargaining table. They come up with creative rules and norms that suggest 
that some of them might have changed their preferences endogenously to the negotiations. In 
other words, negotiations often matter for outcomes, as any negotiation theorist would readily 
admit (see John Odell‟s contribution). Focusing on arguing and reason-giving introduces an 
alternative mode of action and interaction different from bargaining moves based on fixed 
preferences and the mere exchange of information. 
In the meantime, the “deliberative turn” (Neyer 2006) in International Relations has 
reached EU studies. We can distinguish three different strands of contributions to the study of 
argumentative discourse in the field of European integration.
3 First, there are various norma-
tive contributions to deliberative democracy in the EU (see e.g.  Eriksen and Fossum 2000; 
Eriksen et al. 2004; Sabel and Dorf 2006; Joerges 2000; Neyer 2006). This group of authors is 
particularly concerned with the democratic or legitimacy deficit of the European Union. They 
promote institutional designs that enable deliberative discourse in which alternative vie w-
points are represented on an equal footing. The proposed institutional solutions r esemble   4 
closely those identified by scholars approaching arguing and discourse from a more empirical 
angle (see below). 
A second group of authors approaches arguing and deliberation with an empirical 
rather than normative focus. Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer, for example, have studied 
the EU‟s comitology as deliberative bodies (Joerges and Neyer 1997a, b). Their particular 
focus was on the role of expert knowledge in these bodies devoted to implementing EU deci-
sions. Arne Niemann studied arguing and bargaining with regard to the EU‟s external trade 
negotiations (Niemann 2004; Niemann 2006), while Jeffrey Checkel looked at persuasion in 
the context of compliance with the Council of Europe‟s human rights provisions (Checkel 
2001). Finally, there has been quite some recent work on the EU‟s constitutional processes, 
from the negotiations leading up to the single market (Gehring and Kerler 2008) to the Consti-
tutional Convention (Göler 2006; Panke 2006). The contribution of these and other authors 
consists of specifying scope conditions under which deliberation actually matters in terms of 
influencing outcomes in EU negotiation settings.  
A third type of contributions has approached arguing and reason-giving from a rational 
choice perspective. Frank Schimmelfennig in particular has advanced the notion of “rhetorical 
action” in this context (Schimmelfennig 2001, 2003, 2005). In his understanding, rhetoric 
action means using arguments and reasons for strategic purposes. Schimmelfennig‟s concept 
is therefore situated precisely at the intersection of bargaining and arguing. While instrumen-
tally motivated speakers use arguments and justifications to promote their given interests, at 
least someone in the audience must be open to persuasion so that strategic actors can advance 
their  interests.  Schimmelfennig  convincingly  demonstrated  his  approach  empirically  with 
regard to the EU‟s and NATO‟s enlargement decisions. 
   5 
ARGUING AND PERSUASION: CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS
4 
When actors deliberate, they try to figure out in a collective communicative process  
  whether their assumptions  about  the world  and about  cause-effect  relationships  in the 
world are correct (the realm of theoretical discourses), or 
  whether and which norms of appropriate behaviour can be justified under given circum-
stances (the realm of practical or moral discourses). 
Arguing implies that actors challenge the validity claims inherent in  any causal or 
normative  statement  and  seek  a  communicative  consensus  about  their  understanding  of  a 
situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action. Argumen-
tative rationality also means that the participants in a discourse are open to be persuaded by 
the better argument. Power and social hierarchies  consequently  recede  in  the background 
(Habermas  1981;  Habermas  1992).  Argumentative  and  deliberative  behaviour  is  as  goal-
oriented as strategic interactions. The goal, however, is not to pursue one's fixed preferences, 
but to seek a reasoned consensus (Verständigung). Actors' interests, preferences, and the per-
ceptions of the situation are not fixed, but subject to discursive challenges.
5 
Argumentative rationality in this Habermasian sense is based on several ideal-typical 
pre-conditions. First, argumentative consensus-seeking requires the ability to empathize, i.e., 
to see things with the eyes of the interaction partner. Second, actors need to share a “common 
lifeworld” (gemeinsame Lebenswelt), a supply of collective interpretations of the world and of 
themselves, which provides arguing actors with a repertoire of collective understandings to 
which they can refer when making truth claims. Third, actors need to recognize each other as 
equals and need to have equal access to the discourse, which must also be open to other par-
ticipants and public in nature. In this sense then, relationships of power, force, and coercion 
are assumed to recede in the background when argumentative consensus is sought.  
In structural terms, arguing can be distinguished from bargaining through its triadic 
nature (Saretzki 1996). Bargaining actors assess the moves in negotiations solely based on   6 
their own utility functions including private information. In contrast, arguing always involves 
references to a mutually accepted external authority to validate empirical or normative asser-
tions. In international negotiations, such sources of authority (Berufungsgrundlagen) can be 
previously negotiated and agreed-upon treaties, universally held norms, scientific evidence, 
other forms of consensual knowledge, or an audience that serves as adjudicators of the „better 
argument.‟ 
Operationalizing these pre-conditions presents a challenging task. Early empirical stu-
dies including the ones mentioned above then juxtaposed “arguing” versus “bargaining” in 
studying international negotiations. These studies yielded two results. First, arguing and bar-
gaining as modes of interaction do not entirely coincide with communicative modes, and ar-
guing and bargaining speech acts usually go together in reality (Deitelhoff and Müller 2005). 
As a result, we cannot simply infer from either bargaining or arguing speech acts which logic 
of action prevails, be it the logic of consequences or the logic of communicative rationality 
(“arguing”). Second, it is almost impossible to empirically observe actors‟ motivations with 
any certainty, and, third, persuasion actually occurs under circumstances in which one could 
safely assume that none of the actors involved were truth-seeking (for a discussion see Ulbert 
and Risse 2005). Take a courtroom situation: Irrespective of the motivations of the defense 
lawyers or the prosecutors, both sides have to engage in legal reasoning and discourse in order 
to persuade a third party – the judge and/or the jury – that their respective standpoint is cor-
rect. This is precisely why very elaborate procedures are in place to insure that judges and 
juries are open-minded and prepared to be persuaded. Jürgen Habermas concluded from these 
and  other  findings  that  we  need  to  investigate  the  institutional  scope  conditions  enabling 
communicative rationality so that arguing actually leads to persuasion.
6 
This led to a reformulation of the research question that originally triggered the debate. 
If it is impossible to ascertain actors‟ motivations and to observe persuasion and the effects of 
arguing directly, and, yet, their importance for negotiation outcomes is staring us in the face,   7 
concentrating on the scope conditions for the attainment of reasoned consensus becomes es-
sential: Which institutional scope conditions are conducive to enable arguing to prevail in 
multilateral negotiating systems and, thus, to affect both processes and outcomes? In asking 
this question, one can set aside the question of the motivation of actors engaged in arguing 
(Deitelhoff and Müller 2005: 176; Risse 2002: 603). Moreover, the conceptual differences 
between “arguing” as truth-seeking and “rhetorical action” in Schimmelfennig‟s sense of us-
ing reasons for strategic purposes recede in the background. 
 
OPERATIONALIZING PROCESSES OF PERSUASION: HOW DO WE KNOW IT 
WHEN WE SEE IT? 
Empirical studies hence seek to unveil institutional scope conditions for endogenous prefe-
rence changes. Empirical studies therefore typically select their cases on the dependent varia-
ble, usually a surprising negotiation outcome, and subsequently trace the effect of institutional 
scope conditions on the process leading to this outcome.  
 
Outcome: Reasoned Consensus 
Selecting cases on the dependent variable is difficult for two reasons: First, we need to have 
some confidence in the fact that the outcome we are studying indeed entails elements of per-
suasion. Second, in order to make causal inferences about institutional scope conditions, we 
need to ensure variation on the dependent variable while holding actors‟ preferences constant. 
Nicole Deitelhoff, for instance, studied processes of persuasion using the example of the ne-
gotiations leading to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (Deitelhoff 2006, 
2008). By identifying and operationalizing various rationalist theories of institutional negotia-
tion  and  design,  she  assessed  the  counterfactual  at  each  turning  point  in  the  negotiation 
process by controlling for these alternative explanations. The present authors study processes   8 
of persuasion at a natural experiment, the European Convention. To the surprise of everybody 
involved, this particular negotiation setting resulted in an outcome that broke the deadlock on 
many contentious issues only a few months after the previous Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC) had come up with a very unsatisfying outcome. The Convention inter alia comprised 
the same actors (member states) as the IGC, on the one hand, but altered exactly those institu-
tional scope conditions that are generally regarded as conducive to arguing (see below), on the 
other hand. It thus constituted an ideal laboratory for studying processes of persuasion while 
at the same time holding actors‟ preferences constant. 
  More generally, we can discriminate between traces of arguing and bargaining in ne-
gotiation outcomes,  because  effective arguing leads to  a  reasoned consensus, which is  in 
many ways distinguishable from the compromises that typically result from processes of pure 
bargaining.
7 An outcome that is generally regarded as surprising, because it was not expected 
on the basis of represented preferences, initially suggests that actors might have engaged in 
arguing. In addition, if actors give the same reason for such an achievement, this leads to sug-
gest that some actors indeed changed their preferences endogenously to the negotiation. What 
is more, since actors bargaining under a long shadow of the future and, thus, higher uncertain-
ty about distributive effects have incentives to bargain even harder and  delay an agreement 
(Fearon 1998), a surprisingly early agreement  furthermore hints to the effectiveness of ar-
guing. Finally, a disproportionately strong influence of weak actors also suggests a reasoned 
consensus, since asymmetric power should matter less for negotiation outcomes in processes 
of arguing than in pure bargaining.   9 
Operationalization of “reasoned consensus”: 
-  actors give same reasons for its achievement 
-  agreement is surprising, often “problem-solving” character above the lowest common 
denominator 
-  early agreement 
-  influence of “weak” actors 
 
Propositions on Institutional Settings Conducive to Arguing 
A correlation between various institutional scope conditions and a particular negotiation out-
come does not yet allow us to clearly identify the causal mechanism leading to a reasoned 
consensus. Studies on arguing and persuasion in multilateral negotiations have therefore iden-
tified several factors possibly contributing to the prevalence of arguing in negotiations (see 
Ulbert and Risse 2005; Deitelhoff 2006), and explored the way they affect the negotiation 
process. Let us consider each in turn. 
Different types of uncertainty can be expected to be conducive to effective arguing. 
First, actors may lack information about cause-effect relationships that determine possible 
ways and consequences of cooperation (Koremenos et al. 2001). Second, in situations where 
different  roles  apply,  actors  may  be  uncertain  about  their  appropriate  behavior  in  an  ill-
defined situation. While uncertainty about future states of the world is first and foremost a 
property of the issue-area and should vary accordingly, uncertainty about one‟s appropriate 
behavior can be expected to vary with the negotiation setting and with its composition, in par-
ticular. When institutional identities of negotiators overlap, actors become uncertain about 
their appropriate behavior. As a consequence, their counterparts can never be sure about their 
negotiating partners‟ preferences. This should induce arguing. Take the EU‟s comitology, for 
example: These committees are usually composed of member states‟ representatives who, at   10 
the same time, are experts in the matters at stake. As a result, the institutional setting intro-
duces uncertainty about the role identities of the actors as a result of which speakers cannot 
take the interests of their audience for granted. Inconsistency in statements, for instance, and 
actors identifying themselves with different constituencies are observable implications of this 
process.  
Proposition 1: Institutional settings that favour overlapping role identities are likely to in-
crease uncertainty about appropriate behaviour and other actors’ preferences and, thus, the 
likelihood that arguing prevails.  
 
A second institutional scope condition concerns the degree of publicity of negotiations. 
According to Jon Elster, arguing in front of an audience has to be in line with constraints like 
imperfection, consistency and plausibility. In other words, powerful social norms on proce-
dural democracy are constraining in that actors are, first, forced to act in a way that she is not 
perceived as selfish, but as impartial and credible. Second, in order to remain credible, speak-
ers have to follow a coherent line of reasoning. Third, and related, their validity claims have 
to be plausible and maintain verification. Coherent justifications for demands hint to the effect 
of this norm. It moreover varies with the institutional setting: The less certain speakers are 
about the preferences of their audiences, for instance, because it is very heterogeneous, the 
more we would expect these norms affect their derived preferences (Elster 1998). Further, 
these constraining effects should increase the more the consent of the audience is required.  
Proposition 2: A transparent negotiation setting is conducive to persuasion, the more actors 
are uncertain about the preferences of their audiences whose consent is required.  
 
In contrast to Elster, Jeffrey Checkel argues that negotiations in front of a public audi-
ence result in ritualistic rhetoric, and that deliberation behind closed doors is more conducive   11 
to preference changes. Both claims are not self-excluding, but heavily dependent on the kind 
of audience and its required consent. Elster refers to procedural norms of an otherwise neutral 
audience, whereas Checkel (2001: 54; : 222) alludes to attentive domestic audiences that ex-
pect its negotiators to pursue national interests. Once speakers know the preferences of their 
audience whose consent is required, they do not need to argue, but can employ rhetorical de-
vices to sway their audience. Under these conditions (of a principal-agent relationship), se-
crecy and negotiating behind closed doors might be the only way toward problem-solving, 
since it enables speakers to argue “out of the box” and to work toward a reasoned consensus 
without having to fear that some principal in the audience might accuse her of “betraying the 
national interest.” A typical example for such an institutional setting in the EU is COREPER, 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Lewis 2005; see also Jeffrey Lewis‟ contribu-
tion in this volume). 
Proposition 3: Negotiations “behind closed doors” are conducive to persuasion, the more 
actors know the preferences of their audiences whose consent is required. 
 
A final way in which the institutional setting can influence whether arguing is effec-
tive concerns the degree to which it privileges the emergence of “honest brokers.” Honest 
brokers, who are considered trustworthy by the opposing sides and who can acquire authority 
to suggest innovative solutions, can shift negotiations toward a problem-solving mode (see 
Young 1991 for an early argument on this point). Actors referring to the broker‟s proposals 
suggest the effectiveness of this process. The crucial point here is that trustworthiness and 
authority are not only a matter of individual personality solely; they are the result of a specific 
institutional context that privileges and legitimates negotiating authority and leadership. Take 
the EU‟s comitology, once again: Its rules of procedure privilege expertise and, thus, argu-
ments based on knowledge rather than interest. At least, speakers have to frame their interests   12 
in a way consistent with recognized and consensual knowledge (on the role of knowledge in 
negotiations see Haas 1990).  
The above discussion suggests that there are at least two ways in which institutional 
settings may privilege leadership and authority: 
Proposition 4a: The more the institutional norms and procedures privilege authority based on 
expertise and/or moral competence, the more arguing is likely to lead to persuasion. 
Proposition 4b: The more institutional norms and procedures require neutral chairs of nego-
tiations in centralized settings, the more leadership is conducive to the prevalence of arguing. 
 
A PLAUSIBILITY PROBE: EUROPEAN TREATY REVISIONS 
As argued above, the EU provided us with a natural experiment. After a decade of onerous 
and disappointing negotiations in a series of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC), the Heads 
of State and Governments decided to conduct negotiations in a new setting: the European 
Convention. Even though government representatives were present in both settings, and could 
have always vetoed the final outcome, the Convention did in many regards achieve a surpris-
ing outcome, which broke the deadlock on many issues where preferences were originally 
regarded intense and stable. Importantly, the Convention varied exactly those factors that pro-
ponents of arguing have suggested being particularly conducive to its effectiveness: It encom-
passed a larger number and a greater variety of actors (with implications for uncertainty and 
the emergence of leadership), and it was far more transparent than negotiations in IGCs. In 
other words, comparing the IGCs with the Constitutional Convention allows us to vary exact-
ly those institutional scope conditions under investigation here while keeping many other fac-
tors constant. No wonder that there is now a rich literature on the differences between IGCs   13 
and the Convention and how they affected outcomes (see e.g. Göler 2006; Magnette and Ni-
colaides 2004; König and Slapin 2006; Risse and Kleine 2007). 
 
A Specific Puzzle 
In the following we focus on the differences between the Convention and IGCs by comparing 
negotiations on the Single Legal Personality of the European Union. The question of merging 
the legal personalities of the different European Communities into one single entity based on 
one single treaty had occupied European decision-makers since the IGC on Political Union in 
1991-92. As the question of single legal personality was intrinsically tied to the issue of treaty 
simplification, it generally caused controversies on multiple dimensions: Apart from the poss-
ible  legal  effects  of  such  a  merger,  and  concerns  about  ratification  problems,  it  further 
broached the age-old question of the European Union‟s constitutional nature. The main con-
flicts emerged between integrationist countries arguing for a unified approach, and intergo-
vernmentalist countries preferring to keep entities and treaties clearly separated. While this 
question had unsuccessfully been dealt with at the 1996-97 Amsterdam IGC and had been 
deliberately excluded from the negotiations at the 2000 Nice IGC, it was the very first issue 
the Convention agreed on in late 2002. To the great surprise of the parties involved, the Con-
vention‟s Working Groups on Legal Personality recommended merging the legal personalities 
and subsequently agreed on a far-reaching simplification where the treaties and the “pillars” 
would be collapsed into one single framework of the European Union.  
In other words, IGC and Convention resulted in two very different outcomes despite 
the fact that preferences had remained stable. While the IGC agreed on a lowest common 
denominator outcome that basically left the status quo unchanged, the Convention‟s agree-
ment on single legal personality features all signs of a reasoned consensus: participants gave 
the  same  reasons  for  the  decision,  the  agreement  was  obtained  early  in  the  negotiation   14 
process, and it was surprising as exogenous preference changes do not seem to provide a sa-
tisfactory explanation for these diverse outcomes.  
 
The 1996-97 IGC and the Treaty of Amsterdam: No Agreement 
Simplification of the EU‟s complicated treaty structure including the question of a single legal 
personality had been on the IGC‟s agendas for quite some time. In 1996, the Heads of State 
and Government asked the IGC “to consider whether it would be possible to simplify and 
consolidate the Treaties” (European Council 29 March 1996). The debate then focused on the 
implications of a (single) legal personality for the EU‟s capacity for external action. In a re-
port to the IGC, the Council General Secretariat tried to alleviate those fears and explicitly 
advocated a merger of the treaties. It argued that although the EU was not explicitly conferred 
legal personality, it had already developed various procedures as to circumvent this obstacle, 
and  therefore  gained  a  de  facto  legal  personality  alongside  the  EC  (SN  3554/96;  CONF 
3876/96, CONF 3871/96). Yet, the British government and France feared unintended legal 
consequences for the “pillar structure”. The Secretariat‟s legal advisor tried to remove those 
doubts and argued that a single legal personality would have no consequences for the distribu-
tion  of  competences  (Non-Paper  Piris,  16  October).  However,  France  and  Great  Britain 
showed no signs of giving up their objections. 
The issue of legal personality resurfaced in February 1997 when the Secretariat pro-
posed an article on external action that endowed the EU with a single personality (CONF 
3829/97). This proposal as well as another attempt by the Dutch Presidency was immediately 
rejected by the UK and Denmark (Interview with Jean-Paul Jacqué, 25 January 2006). A far-
reaching simplification on the basis of a single legal personality thus seemed to be out of 
reach. Arguments on part of the “friends of the presidency” that sought to remove doubts 
about unintended legal consequences from a single legal personality were dismissed, and pro-  15 
posals for facilitation of ratification rejected. But the French and British (and Danish) opposi-
tion remained insurmountable. In the end, the IGC agreed on the least ambitious simplifica-
tion option: The Treaty of Amsterdam deleted a number of obsolete provisions and renum-
bered the articles, but the issue of legal personality was left unchanged.  
In sum, the negotiations on legal personality in the context of the Amsterdam IGC 
were subject to processes of bargaining. Preferences were not uncertain, but clear and rigid 
(Proposition  1).  Negotiating  parties  were  unmistakably  divided  in  two  camps:  Belgium, 
backed by a majority of Member States, was the main spokesperson for the advocates of a 
merger of the entities, while the UK, backed by France, and Denmark, opposed the conferral 
of a single legal personality to the EU. Their argumentation was not constrained by procedural 
norms as suggested in the proposition on transparency (Proposition 2) as this camp of oppo-
nents advanced several lines of reasoning at the same time. All efforts by the General Secreta-
riat to dissipate these doubts on the basis of their expert knowledge could not overcome the 
delegations‟ opposition. 
 
The European Convention 
Early on during the European Convention, its chairman, Valéry Giscard D‟Estaing, suggested 
that the Convention should aim at drafting a single text without loose ends in order to maxim-
ize its influence on the subsequent IGC. Once the Convention had accepted this approach, it 
began questioning the “inviolability” of the acquis and thus assumed the same task as an IGC. 
Nonetheless, the question of the actual format of the Convention‟s final outcome remained 
unaddressed until the Convention‟s presidium established a number of Working Groups in-
cluding one on the Legal Personality of the EU (WG III).  
Very early on during the proceedings of the European Convention, the chairman estab-
lished consensus as its decision rule. Importantly, he deliberately begged the question what it   16 
meant precisely (for a detailed discussion see König and Slapin 2006). A second uncertainty 
resulted from fact that the vast majority of Conventioneers were members of parliaments, 
both European and national. As a result, speakers could never be sure whether their audiences 
held national preferences, party preferences, European versus national ones, or simply per-
sonal preferences. Thus, the institutional settings of the Convention and its decision rules in-
troduced a large amount of uncertainty, at least as compared with ordinary IGCs (proposition 
1). 
In the beginning of June 2002, Working Group III on the Legal Personality assumed 
its work. It was chaired by Giuliano Amato, the former Prime Minister of Italy and a highly 
recognized constitutional lawyer. Although discussions were not public, the transparency of 
the Convention also pervaded the proceedings in the WG as “there were always interested 
people in the room we did not know, but who were not showed the door.
8”  
The first meeting of the Working Group was held on 18 June, 2002, and started with a 
tour de table, during which every Conventioneer revealed his or her opinion to the issues un-
der consideration. The chairman pointed out that a decision on an explicit recognition of a 
legal personality for the Union implied changes of constitutional nature. The group would 
therefore have to discuss possible effects for the current system of competences, the pillar 
structure, the procedures for the conclusion of international agreements and the overall simpli-
fication of the treaties (CONV 132/02). The tour revealed that the level of expertise among 
the Conventioneers was uneven, with some having no experience with European affairs and 
others being experts on the question of legal personality. Moreover, ideological cleavages 
resurfaced, since some Conventioneers from the UK and France were particularly hesitant.
9 
The next meetings on 26 June and 10 July were held with the participation of the legal 
advisors of the Parliament, the Council, and  the Commission. Just as during the IGC, these 
experts were in almost complete agreement and emphasized what had been the legal majority   17 
opinion for years: that the explicit recognition of the legal personality of the Union as well as 
the merger of the entities were desirable for reasons of transparency and efficiency, and fur-
thermore, from a legal point of view, distinct from the question of the allocation of compe-
tences and the institutional balance (proposition 4a). According to participants, the statement 
by Jean-Claude Piris made the difference and constituted a first “turning point”. The General 
Secretariat‟s legal advisor, who had fought vehemently, but unsuccessfully for a Single Legal 
Personality in Amsterdam, was suddenly listened to. He pointed out again that the EU indeed 
had already a de facto legal personality on the international scene, but that it was desirable to 
recognize it explicitly (Working Group 3, Working Document 3: 8-10). 
Piris did not use different arguments from those he had used during the Amsterdam 
IGC, but people listened to him this time. In the context of the Convention‟s Working Group, 
the institutional context had changed: The WG members became slowly persuaded that a sin-
gle entity would not necessarily entail unintended legal consequences and jeopardize the pillar 
structure (CONV 170/02). In a first straw poll within the WG only one member, a French 
Euroskeptic, objected (WG III, WD 10).  
But the WG had not yet explicitly discussed the implications for the form of the trea-
ties and the Convention‟s final product. When the Working Group resumed its deliberations 
in the fall of 2002, the hearing of another expert, Prof. Bruno De Witte, constituted the next 
turning point in the deliberations. De Witte made again clear that if the group was to decide 
the merger of the entities, the merger of the treaties would be a logical consequence. In other 
words, a single legal personality would necessarily imply drawing up an all-encompassing 
treaty that would legally repeal the existing primary law (WG III, WD 27). Shortly after this 
final hearing, Amato announced an emerging broad consensus for the attribution of a single 
legal personality for the EU during a Plenary Session of the Convention. The European Con-
vention then adopted this proposal by consensus as a result of which drafting of the Constitu-  18 
tional Treaty could go ahead.
10 The Constitutional Treaty established the single legal person-
ality of the European Union and this provision actually survived the treaty‟s failure after the 
French and Dutch referendums. The Treaty of Lisbon still establishes the single legal person-
ality (Art. 47) while keeping the treaties separate. 
In sum, we conclude that the negotiations on legal personality in the context of the 
Convention feature traces of arguing leading to persuasion. In comparing the institutional set-
tings, we find that several scope conditions were indeed conducive to that effect. It was not so 
much the reasons given per se that produced the result, but the difference in institutional set-
tings between the Amsterdam IGC and the European Convention and its Working Groups 
which enabled arguing to prevail.  
First, in contrast to the Amsterdam IGC, cleavages in the Convention were not clear 
and rigid, but cross-cutting and in flux as there were not clearly identifiable camps within the 
Working Group and the Convention in general (proposition 1). We were able to observe dif-
ferences between the Presidium and the Secretariat, and hesitation on part of French, British 
and Swedish national parliamentarians instead of government officials.  
Second, in contrast to the IGC, we do not observe actors switching between different 
lines of reasoning. In Amsterdam, the UK and France brought up several different arguments 
ranging from vague concerns about unintended legal consequences, to more pronounced wor-
ries about implications of a single legal personality for external action, to distress about possi-
ble ratification problems. In the case of the Convention, however, British representative never 
backed out of their agreement, but consistently referred to the advantages of a single legal 
personality for the simplification of the treaties (e.g. Peter Hain, 03 October 2002). 
Third, leadership appeared to be particularly decisive to helping arguing prevail in the 
context of the Convention (proposition 4b). During the Amsterdam IGC, all efforts by the 
European Council‟s General Secretariat to dissipate doubts with regard to unintended legal   19 
consequences and ratification problems failed. Exactly the same arguments put forward by the 
same legal advisor found fruitful ground in the Convention. According to the participants, this 
had less to do with the arguments as such, but rather with the problem-solving atmosphere the 
Chairman had created, and the Conventioneers readiness  to consider other actors‟ validity 
claims. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We argued in this article that focusing on the institutional scope conditions for the effective-
ness of arguing is imperative for a thorough understanding of negotiation processes and out-
comes as different institutional factors induce actors to take validity claims into account and 
change their policy preferences accordingly. We identified three such conditions, namely the 
degree to which the institutional setting induces uncertainty about the preferences of the ac-
tors involved, the transparency of the process, and the extent to which the institutional setting 
enables leadership and competent authority to influence the process. We then used the exam-
ple of the negotiations on the EU‟s single legal personality at the 1996-97 Amsterdam IGC as 
compared to the European Convention to demonstrate that differences in the institutional set-
ting largely explains the difference in outcomes as well as the effects of arguing on persua-
sion. 
At this point, we do not have sufficient evidence to demonstrate which of the three in-
stitutional conditions tends to be the most important. This is where future research should 
follow up on. We need to know more about both the design and the effects deliberative insti-
tutions. Why are some negotiation settings more transparent than others? Why do some set-
tings establish formal leadership while others are more decentralized? Why are some negotia-
tions more inclusive than others? And how do these institutional features affect negotiation 
processes and outcomes?   20 
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Notes 
 
1 The empirical findings are based on research carried out in the framework of the Integrated 
Project “New Modes of European Governance” (NEWGOV), funded in the EU‟s 6
th Frame-
work  Program  on  Socio-Economic  Research  (Contract  No  CIT1-CT-2004-506392).  For 
comments on this article, we thank Andreas Duer, Gemma Mateo, and Daniel Thomas, as 
well as participants at the workshop on Negotation Theory and the EU at the University Col-
lege Dublin, Nov. 14-15, 2008. 
2 The literature is vast and fastly growing. See e.g. Risse 2000; Crawford 2002; Lynch 2002; 
Müller 2004; Deitelhoff 2006; Niesen and Herborth 2007; Ulbert and Risse 2005; Hol-
zscheiter 2006; special issue of Acta Politica, 2005. 
3 A fourth contribution to the study of discourse focuses on the “power of discourse” and is 
heavily influenced by the works of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Ernesto Laclau, and 
Chantal Mouffe. See e.g. Diez 2001; Fierke and Wiener 1999. See also “critical discourse 
analysis”  as  developed  by  Norman  Fairclough  and  Ruth  Wodak  (Fairclough  and  Wodak 
1997) which has also been applied to the EU recently (e.g. Oberhuber et al. 2005; Wodak 
2004). In the following, however, we focus on arguing and reason-giving in the Habermasian 
meaning of discourse which is more suitable for a special issue devoted to negotiation theory. 
4 The following summarizes Risse 2000, 2004. 
5 Habermas introduces behaviour oriented toward reaching a common understanding (ver-
ständigungsorientiertes Handeln) as follows: “I speak of communicative actions when the 
action orientations of the participating actors are not coordinated via egocentric calculations 
of success, but through acts of understanding. Participants are not primarily oriented toward 
their own success in communicative action; they pursue their individual goals under the con-
dition that they can co-ordinate their action plans on the basis of shared definitions of the   23 
 
situation” (Habermas 1981, vol. 1, 385; our translation). The goal of such communicative 
action is to seek a reasoned consensus (Verständigung). 
6 At a conference in Frankfurt/Main in June 2006. See Habermas 2007; also Deitelhoff 2007. 
7 To be sure, both interaction modes need not result in a settlement. Negotiations break down 
or sometimes lead to an informed agreement of disagree. 
8 Interview Giuliano Amato, 4 November 2005. 
9 This and the following information is taken from interviews with Giuliano Amato, 4 No-
vember 2005; Ricardo Passos 26 January 2006; and Hervé Bribosia, 4 May 2005. 
10 Note that an agreement on the single legal personality had to precede any drafting of treaty 
documents. Had any of the Conventioneers used this issue as a bargaining chip to extract oth-
er concessions later on, the whole exercise of drafting a single treaty would have failed. We 
owe this insight to a meeting with Dr. Meyer-Landrut. 